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Abstract 
The study of electoral contestation generally focuses on districts or regions rather than polities. 
We present a new dataset that measures electoral contestation through historical records of 
elections in sovereign and semi-sovereign polities throughout the world from 1789 to the present. 
We also offer a new index of contestation intended to capture multiple dimensions of this complex 
concept. Our second objective is to explain variation across polities and through time in electoral 
contestation. We argue that the degree of contestation in a polity is affected by demography, with 
larger polities fostering greater electoral contestation. This hypothesis is tested with a series of 
cross-national regression tests that employ a variety of specifications and estimators –cross-
sectional, fixed-effect, and instrumental variable. We find a robust association between population 
and contestation extending throughout the modern era. 
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Introduction 
Electoral contestation (aka competition) is widely regarded as a central element of democracy 
(Becker 1958; Dahl 1956, 1971; Sartori 1976: 217; Schumpeter 1942/1950; Strom 1992). Studies 
indicate that enhanced competitiveness in votes or seats, or frequent turnover, is associated with 
more programmatic politics (Keefer 2006; Keefer & Vlaicu 2008; Lachat 2011), greater activity on 
the part of representatives (Konisky & Ueda 2011), greater responsiveness or accountability 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Beer & Mitchell 2004; Gordon & Huber 2007; Griffin 2006; Jones 2013; 
Powell 2000; but see Brunell 2008; Cleary 2007; Fiorina 1973), greater efficiency and lower political 
rents (Barro 1973; Stigler 1972; Wittman 1989, 1995), political reform (Borges 2008; Geddes 1991, 
1994; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Heller, Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés 2011; Ting et al. 2013), lower 
corruption (Weitz-Shapiro 2012), lower levels of political protest (Arce & Mangonnet 2013), and 
stronger growth performance (Berkowitz & Clay 2012; Besley, Persson & Sturm 2010; Padovano 
& Ricciuti 2009).1  
 Although a good deal of work has accumulated on these subjects, the study of contestation 
is limited in two respects. First, it generally focuses on districts or regions rather than polities, 
meaning that we know a lot less about contestation at national levels than at subnational levels. 
Second, extant work generally focuses on the probable effects of contestation, rather than its 
causes. To the extent that contestation affects outcomes we care about, we should also be 
interested in its determinants. 
This study makes several contributions. First, we measure electoral contestation through 
historical records of elections in sovereign and semi-sovereign polities throughout the world from 
1789 to the present, producing a new dataset with ~36,000 observations. Second, we offer a new 
measure of contestation intended to capture multiple dimensions of this complex concept. Third, 
we explain variation across polities and through time. We argue that the degree of contestation in 
a polity is affected by demography, with larger polities fostering greater electoral contestation.  
The first section of the paper lays out our explanatory framework. The second section 
discusses issues of conceptualization and measurement, introduces the data, illustrates various 
                                               
1 Of course, contestation can have deleterious effects if parties utilize para-military groups to round up supporters and 
intimidate opponents, as occurred in Weimar Germany and contemporary Jamaica (Clarke 2006). We should also bear 
in mind that in winner-take-all elections competition may entail a decline in responsiveness and trust (Brunell 2008; 
Brunell & Buchler 2009; Buchler 2005, 2011). Since only one candidate or party can win, all those supporting the 
losing candidate or party are not likely to be well-represented and are likely to be less trusting of the candidate who 
wins. In a highly competitive district, this is nearly half of the voters. (The same dynamic does not apply in an electoral 
system in which votes are allocated proportionally to candidates and there are multiple seats in a single district.) There 
is also work that finds that high levels of competitiveness can exacerbate clientelism and corruption (Lindberg and 
Morrison 2008; Nyblade and Reed 2008; Golden and Tiwari 2009). These caveats notwithstanding, contestation seems 
to be associated with more good things than bad. For a wide-ranging discussion, see Bardhan & Yang (2004). 
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aggregation techniques, and compares our index with alternatives. The third section displays 
historical patterns in electoral contestation throughout the world. The fourth section tests the 
argument with a series of cross-national regression tests that employ a variety of specifications and 
estimators – cross-sectional, fixed-effect, and instrumental-variable. We find a robust association 
between population and contestation extending throughout the modern era. 
 
I. Explanatory Framework 
Many factors assuredly contribute to electoral contestation; like democracy, it is a complex 
outcome sensitive to innumerable inputs (Coppedge 2012). Here, we focus on a distal feature – 
demography – that we believe to be sizeable and persistent, perhaps more than any other causal 
factor. 
We begin with a number of core assumptions, which we regard as plausible even if not 
entirely provable. We assume that leaders (the individual or group that controls the executive) 
would prefer to monopolize power but also value personal security (for their life and property, 
and the lives and property of their supporters), revenue, and territory. While citizens may have no 
ex ante preference for a particular constitutional structure, we assume that they have a strong 
preference to be governed by “one of their own,” i.e., someone whom they trust, who hails from 
the social group with which they identify, and who is assumed to represent the interests of that 
group.2 
 Now, let us consider the impact of demography. As the size of a community grows, the 
challenges of governance become more complex. This is a product of sheer numbers and also of 
the greater social diversity that usually accompanies greater size.  
 By diversity, we mean the number of viable social groups in a polity, as defined by ethnicity, 
religion, language, ideology, social class, and/or region. This should be distinguished from 
fractionalization indices, which measure the population distribution across social groups. The first 
is strongly correlated with polity size, while the second is only weakly correlated (AUTHOR 
FORTHCOMING). Note also that social groups may be defined in many different ways. In some 
polities, religion is paramount, in others language or ethnicity – or some other factor not captured 
in any standard measure. Regional identity may be especially important as parties often have a 
regional base, which means that a greater number of regional identities translates into a larger party 
system (ceteris paribus). If social groups are regionally defined one would expect this to foster 
greater contestation even if the regions do not have highly distinctive ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
                                               
2 This follows from studies of in-group trust (Foddy et al. 2009) 
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characteristics (as in South Korea). So, diversity refers here to any sort of social identity, a matter 
that we expect to vary across polities and through time. 
 Size and diversity, in turn, generate a greater number of political conflicts (Raleigh & Hegre 
2009: 224), greater social distrust (Putnam 2007), and greater political distrust (Denters 2002; 
Hansen 2013; Matsubayashi 2007; Rahn & Rudolph 2005).  
It follows that in a small society leaders may satisfy everyone’s preferences without resort 
to elections if the leadership group is viewed as belonging to the dominant social group. And, if 
multi-party elections are allowed the leadership group is likely to claim a vast majority of the votes. 
Because elections are mute (either they are not held at all or they are monopolized by a single 
party), political demands will be handled through mechanisms of consultation and patronage.  
By contrast, in a large society the leadership group will find it more difficult to satisfy 
citizens’ desire to be governed by one of their own. While leaders may pretend to represent 
everyone, this claim is unlikely to be very convincing in a diverse society. Likewise, mechanisms 
of consultation and patronage are unlikely to operate effectively in a society of tens of millions, or 
hundreds of millions. Private agreements, informal understandings, and personal relationships will 
be harder to monitor, harder to enforce, and less legitimate.  
Thus, while electoral contestation may not be anyone’s first choice, it may provide an 
optimal solution in a large (heterogeneous) society because it promises representation for multiple 
groups, satisfying the core demand that citizens be ruled by one of their own. Even those not 
embraced by the current ruler or ruling party may enjoy a share of power in the legislature and 
may reasonably hope to govern someday in their own right. Importantly, the same demographic 
factors that augur for an election-based system of leadership selection also augur for a fragmented 
electoral field in which no single party is likely to gain a majority of votes or seats and in which 
there is likely to be frequent rotation among leadership groups. Demography thus drives all three 
dimensions of contestation. 
Granted, size also poses coordination problems for citizens. In a model of democratization 
in which citizens must work together in order to achieve their preference for democracy, this is 
problematic. However, we do not assume a preference for democracy or the narrower goal of 
electoral contestation, and our framework does not depend upon coordination among various out-
groups. Note that many forms of dissent can be exercised unilaterally. A single social group may 
refuse to pay taxes, agitate for independence, wage a guerrilla war, or sponsor political 
assassinations if their desire to be governed by one of their own is violated (i.e., if they feel excluded 
from power). Insofar as rulers value security, revenue, and territory (core assumptions in our 
model), these are costly dissents. If multi-party elections can solve these problems, while still 
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offering the leader some degree of control, this may be seen as an acceptable solution. Thus, while 
leaders are unlikely to look favorably upon electoral contestation they may be more inclined to 
acquiesce in a large society than in a small society, where monopolization of power is easier to 
maintain. 
 By way of conclusion, it is important to emphasize that this is a theory of contestation, not 
of democratization. Indeed, size poses problems for democracy, which may account for why 
studies have found no consistent relationship between the population of a polity and its regime-
type (author forthcoming). We pointed out that a larger polity is likely to foster a greater number 
of conflicts. This may negatively impact the quality of elections as well as relationships among 
political institutions (legislature, executive, judiciary, independent agencies, the press), inhibiting 
the independence of each body. Insofar as social peace and consensus on core policies are required 
for successful democratic consolidation large societies are probably at a disadvantage. It is easier 
to respect civil liberty if no social group is agitating for separation or threatening to overthrow the 
state. Thus, we make no claims about the relationship of demography to democratization, writ 
large. Our claims are limited to one component of democracy, electoral contestation. 
 
II. Measuring Electoral Contestation 
As with any abstract concept, electoral contestation invites many approaches to operationalization 
(Bartolini 1999, 2000; Strom 1989). In this section, we discuss data sources, introduce a new index, 
discuss alternate measures, and compare our index with indices of democracy. 
Data  
Our goal is to measure contestation across all polities in the modern era, i.e., from 1789 to the 
present. Polities include formally sovereign countries and also defunct countries (e.g., DDR), 
semisovereign territories (e.g., Bermuda), and colonies (e.g., Gold Coast).  
Fortunately, national elections are high-profile events and election results are recorded in 
a number of places. It is important to bear in mind that these are official results, as posted by the 
government or electoral management body. They may, or may not, reflect the intentions of voters, 
not to mention the intentions of citizens who did not vote. Access to the ballot may be limited, 
access to polling places may be restricted, and election fraud and coercion may affect the officially 
posted results. Electoral contestation refers to the degree of contestation that governments are 
willing to permit, and to report. A government that suppresses contestation receives a lower score 
on our indices, which seems appropriate given that electoral contestation is unlikely to have any 
impact on electoral accountability if the government does not recognize it. 
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Core data sources include Caramani (2000), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen, Grotz & Harmann 
(2002), Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut (1999), and Nohlen & Stover (2010). These are 
supplemented, as needed, by Wikipedia entries and the homepages of national parliaments. For 
some national elections, district-level results are also available. However, the largest district-level 
databases – the Constituency-Level Elections Archive [CLEA] (Kollman et al. 2011) and the Multi-
level Elections Archive [MLEA] (Gerring et al. 2015) – do not have broad polity and historical 
coverage. Consequently, we cannot use these district-level databases to construct a national-level 
database. 
 Sources generally do not record election results for all parties. We make a strategic decision 
to collect results for the top three parties in each election (though even here data is not entirely 
complete). This data is collected for national elections to the lower chamber or unicameral 
chamber of the legislature and the presidency (if the head of state is directly elected). For each, we 
record the number of votes obtained by the top three contestants, and – for legislative elections – 
the number of seats. Contestants are identified by party if there is a party affiliation; otherwise, 
they are noted as independent. We also record the total number of votes and seats so that vote- 
and seat-shares can be calculated. With this data, we undertake to measure the level of contestation 
in legislative elections (based on votes or seats) and presidential elections (based on votes).   
A New Index 
Our understanding of contestation (aka competition) is guided by the goal of electoral 
accountability – the capacity of electors to monitor elected officials and, subsequently, to reward 
or punish them through the electoral process.3 Accordingly, parties rather than individual 
candidates are regarded as vehicles of contestation, as the former cannot be held accountable 
across various branches of government and over the longer-term. Indeed, where elections are 
fought among independent (non-party affiliated) candidates this is often a conscious ploy on the 
part of elites to fragment political opposition. 
Electoral contestation thus refers to the degree of party-based competition within a polity. 
Where contestation is high, no single party is able to dominate the electoral field. Monopolization 
of power is prevented, and elected officials are under continual threat of losing their jobs.4 
Uncertainty reigns. 
                                               
3 Contestation affects other aspects of politics as well. For example, high contestation generally enhances turnout, and 
for this purpose a somewhat different operationalization of the concept may be required (Grofman & Selb 2009).  
4 We will largely focus on political parties as the relevant actor of interest, rather than individual candidates, since these 
organizations are generally more suitable as vehicles for collective accountability. However, in the absence of (strong) 
parties, many of the same dynamics we identify would apply to individual politicians. 
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So defined, electoral contestation may be operationalized according to three empirical 
dimensions. There is, first of all, (a) the existence of elections. A polity with no elections has zero 
contestation, by definition. Where elections occur, the degree of contestation in a polity may be 
measured by (b) the closeness of the outcome (“competitiveness”) and (c) the occurrence of 
turnover (“alternation”). We assume that turnover is essential for obtaining electoral 
accountability, and hence an integral empirical dimension of the concept. 
To integrate these dimensions into a single index we propose an incumbent-challenger 
formula. This is calculated as the incumbent share (of votes or seats) minus the share of the largest 
challenger, subtracted from 100. “Incumbent” is defined as the plurality winner in the previous 
election. “Challenger” is defined as the runner-up in the current election. When the incumbent 
falls into second place, or further down, we judge that “turnover” has occurred. The resulting 
measure varies, in principle, from 0 (no contestation) to 200 (the incumbent party receives no 
votes or seats), with 100 signaling the point at which turnover occurs.  
In a polity’s first election, or the first election after an interregnum (caused by a seizure of 
power, a discontinuation of elections, a new constitution, foreign occupation, or some other 
mishap), there is no incumbent. Here, the largest party is treated as the incumbent. “First” elections 
cannot receive a score above 100 because turnover is (by definition) impossible.  
Where the incumbent party drops out entirely, or falls below third place, we view this as 
an instance of party failure rather than electoral contestation. Sometimes, party failure is a product 
of political unrest or persecution. Sometimes, it is a product of political reorganization (indeed, a 
new party may contain many of the members of the old party). And sometimes, it is a product of 
a party that served as a vehicle for a particular candidate, who drops out leaving the party bereft 
of supporters. None of these scenarios conform to theoretical models of electoral accountability, 
where a degree of continuity among major parties is assumed. Thus, in those instances where the 
incumbent party vote share falls below the vote share of the third largest party, we treat the latter 
as the “incumbent” in our calculations.  
Where multiple elections for a single office (president or parliament) occur in a single year 
we record the last of these elections as the value for that year. (Multiple elections are an infrequent 
occurrence. Taking the average value across elections within that year has virtually no effect on our 
index or on any of the results reported below.) 
We code all years prior to the first election or during an electoral interregnum (when elections 
are interrupted or the elective body is prorogued) as zero (0), signaling an absence of electoral 
contestation. This coding is based on the Electoral regime (“elecrec”) variables, calculated for 
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legislative and presidential elections respectively, in the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge 
et al. 2018). 
Years in between elections are filled in with results from the previous election unless there 
is an electoral interregnum, as discussed. The assumption is that results from the last election 
characterize the state of electoral contestation until the next election. 
This set of coding procedures may be applied to any elective body – collective (legislative) 
or unitary (presidential). Election results may be measured in votes (for legislative or presidential 
elections) or seats (for legislative elections). 
Since votes are informative across all elective bodies, we choose this outcome for our core 
index, which combines results from legislative and presidential elections. In parliamentary systems, 
the value of the composite index is solely a product of legislative elections. In presidential systems, 
we count elections to both branches separately and combine them by taking the mean value. The 
assumption of equal weighting presumes that both elections are highly salient (even if not equally 
consequential), and thus relevant for understanding a polity’s overall level of electoral contestation. 
We do not presume to judge the relative power of different branches, a feature that depends upon 
both formal powers and informal practices and is likely to change over time – a difficult 
measurement issue that lies orthogonal to our theoretical concerns (Shugart & Carey 1992). 
The resulting index refers to a party’s electoral status, measured in votes or seats. This may 
or may not translate into control over the legislature or the executive. The largest party in the 
legislature may be shut out of power due to coalitional politics; very occasionally, the largest vote-
getter in a presidential election does not obtain office (as in the US election in 2016). Our index 
registers electoral power, not policymaking power, although we assume the two concepts are highly 
correlated.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize that while electoral contestation is a component of 
electoral democracy it is not an adequate proxy for that broader concept, as discussed in Appendix 
C. 
Largest-party and Top-two Indices 
The incumbent-challenger formula may be contrasted with other approaches to measuring 
electoral contestation. Foremost among these are formulas based on the largest party and the top-
two parties. 
 The largest-party formula focuses on the vote- or seat-share of the largest party, subtracted 
from 100. This index varies, in principle, from 0 (monopolization of votes or seats by one party 
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or candidate) to 99 (where the largest party or candidate wins an infinitesimal share of votes or 
seats).  
 This approach has the benefit of broad coverage and ease of coding and interpretation. 
However, it takes no notice of the performance of other parties/candidates. If a party wins 51% 
of the votes or seats the contestation score is 49, regardless of how votes or seats are distributed 
among the challengers. An election in which the most successful challenger earns 49% of the votes 
is coded the same as an election in which ten challengers divide up the 49%. This is problematic 
insofar as a fragmented opposition makes it more difficult to solve coordination dilemmas, 
necessary to provide an effective counterweight to the dominant party. 
 The top-two formula is calculated as 100 minus the difference between the first and second 
place parties. The resulting measure ranges from 0 (where one party takes all the votes or seats) to 
100 (where two parties tie). This approach allows one to distinguish between a unified and divided 
opposition. 
However, neither of these traditional formulas is capable of distinguishing instances of 
turnover from instances of single-party dominance. A polity where a single party wins every 
election receives the same score as a polity where different parties alternate in power (so long as 
the vote shares of the winning parties in both polities are the same). Likewise, a polity where parties 
alternate in power, each winning by large margins, receives a lower score than a polity in which a 
single party wins every election by a close margin.  
Table 1 illustrates how the largest-party and top-two formulas compare with the 
incumbent-challenger formula by looking at a set of hypothetical electoral outcomes and the scores 
each measure would produce. All three formulas identify profile #1 as the least competitive. By 
contrast, the profiles with the highest contestation are different across the three measures. Under 
the largest-party measure, profile #5 has the highest level of contestation. Profiles #2 and #3 are 
the most competitive under the top two measure, while #5 has the highest level of contestation 
under our incumbent-challenger measure. Another advantage of our incumbent-challenger 
measure is apparent when we compare profiles #2 and #3. The first two measures give us no way 
to distinguish between these two profiles. However, incumbent-challenger takes into account that 
there is turnover in which party is the largest vote-getter in profiles 3 & 5, reflecting scores above 
100.  
Each of these three formulas (incumbent-challenger, largest-party, top-two) may be 
applied to different outcomes (legislative and presidential votes, legislative votes, and legislative 
seats), following the data and coding procedures described in the previous section. This generates 
a typology with nine possible indices of contestation, as shown in panel (a) of Table 2. Our 
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preferred index – the incumbent-challenger index applied to legislative and presidential votes – is 
in cell #1. (We omit the purely presidential index as it applies only to presidential systems, a small 
and unrepresentative sub-sample of the world.) 
 
Table 1:  Three Contestation Formulas Illustrated 
Election results 
Largest-Party 
100-A 
Top-Two 
100-(A-B) 
Incumbent-
Challenger 
100-(I-Ch) 
1.  A (I) 
B (Ch) 
C 
80 
15 
05 
20 35 35 
2.  A (I) 
B (Ch) 
51 
49 49 98 98 
3.  A (Ch) 
B (I) 
51 
49 49 98 102 
4.  A (I) 
B (Ch) 
C 
51 
25 
24 
49 74 74 
5.  A (Ch) 
B (I) 
C 
35 
30 
25 
65 95 105 
Note:  Hypothetical election results, showing vote shares for the top parties 
and the coding they would receive according to three contestation formulas. 
I = incumbent party, Ch = largest challenger party. 
 
 
Panel (b) displays descriptive statistics for each of these indices. It will be seen that slightly 
more data is available for seats than for votes, and more data is available for the largest-party 
formula than the other formulas, which require information for two parties rather than just one. 
All measures contain a mode at zero, representing a non-electoral period (before elections are 
established or during which elections are suspended) or an election in which the largest party or 
incumbent wins all the votes or seats. 
Importantly, these six measures of contestation provide a more extensive sample than is 
provided by any extant measure of politics or political institutions. By way of comparison, the 
democracy index with the most extensive country and historical coverage offers ~17,000 country-
years (Skaaning et al. 2015). Our samples extend to 192-94 polities, ~3,000 elections and ~36,000 
polity-year observations. This is primarily because we are able to measure contestation in 
semisovereign units such as colonies, while traditional indices are limited to sovereign units. A full 
list of countries and years in our dataset is contained in Table A4. (Readers should bear in mind 
that samples are smaller in many of the regression analyses due to missing data on relevant 
covariates. 
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Table 2:  Nine Contestation Indices 
 
 
Legislative/ 
presidential 
votes 
Legislative 
votes 
Legislative 
seats 
Incumbent-challenger 1* 2 3 
Largest-party 4 5 6 
Top-two 7 8 9 
 
 (a) Typology: three formulas applied to three electoral outcomes 
 
 
 Polities Elections Observations Mean Std dev Zeroes (%) Max 
1 194 2,921 35,814 23 39 70 190 
2 192 2,834 34,812 22 39 73 190 
3 194 3,179 36,585 23 39 70 193 
4 194 2,978 36,198 14 24 70 125 
5 192 2,868 35,005 14 25 73 94 
6 194 3,224 36,871 14 24 70 100 
7 194 2,960 36,038 22 36 69 125 
8 192 2,868 35,005 22 37 71 125 
9 194 3,185 36,660 22 35 67 100 
 
(b) Descriptive statistics (numbers rounded to nearest integer) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1         
2 0.98 1        
3 0.90 0.93 1       
4 0.91 0.89 0.78 1      
5 0.90 0.91 0.80 0.97 1     
6 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.89 1    
7 0.95 0.92 0.81 0.95 0.94 0.81 1   
8 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.93 0.95 0.84 0.98 1  
9 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.90 1 
 
(c) Intercorrelations (Pearson’s r) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1         
2 0.95 1        
3 0.78 0.85 1       
4 0.72 0.59 0.44 1      
5 0.61 0.62 0.49 0.90 1     
6 0.42 0.47 0.64 0.60 0.76 1    
7 0.83 0.72 0.51 0.85 0.74 0.51 1   
8 0.75 0.76 0.56 0.76 0.81 0.61 0.94 1  
9 0.53 0.56 0.73 0.57 0.64 0.89 0.64 0.72 1 
 
(d) Intercorrelations (Pearson’s r) – zero values excluded 
 
Panel (c) displays a correlation table, showing how closely the nine indices track each other. 
A principal component analysis, shown in Table A3, demonstrates that nearly all of the variance 
(0.95) is contained in the first component, suggesting that these nine indices are measuring the 
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same underlying latent trait. However, when zero scores are excluded (i.e., multi-party elections 
are allowed), scores differ appreciably across the indices, as shown in panel (d).  
Other Alternatives 
Having introduced nine indices, we turn to several other alternatives that are more complex – and, 
for that reason, harder to measure. We argue that our preferred measure – the incumbent-
challenger index – is a more appropriate choice as an overall measure of electoral contestation at 
national levels. 
Competition (Vanhanen).  The only extant global dataset that measures contestation at 
national levels was produced several decades ago by Tatu Vanhanen (2000: 253-55). Vanhanen 
adopts the largest-party formula with several additional considerations that set it apart from 
options illustrated in Table 1. First, where information on vote shares are unavailable, seat shares 
are substituted. Second, if competitors in legislative elections are independent candidates rather 
than organized parties the largest party is assigned a score of 30%. Third, if the vote (or seat) share 
garnered by the largest party falls below 30% it is nonetheless assigned a score of 30%, under the 
assumption that any further diminution is a product of electoral system laws and is irrelevant to 
the quality of democracy. Fourth, if the executive is unelected (e.g., a monarch, military leader, 
revolutionary group), the largest party is assumed to have won 100% of the vote. Fifth, in polities 
with a separately elected chief executive, results for presidential and legislative elections are 
combined based on a judgment of how dominant each branch is. If branches are co-equal, each is 
assigned a weight of 50%; if the executive is more powerful it receives a weighting of 75%; and so 
forth. It is not possible to tell from the data and supporting materials how many observations, or 
which observations, these five ad hoc coding principles affect.  
Vanhanen’s special coding rules may be justifiable in light of his theoretical goal to 
construct a composite measure of democracy, which he derives from a multiplication of two 
indices: Competition (above) and Participation (turnout in each election). Our goal, however, is 
focused narrowly on contestation (aka competition). For this purpose, we need a more finely-
grained set of measures.  
 Party-system measures.  A rather different approach to measuring contestation encompasses 
the entire party system via indices of “fractionalization,” “effective parties,” or the entry and exit 
of new parties (Harmel & Robertson 1985). This approach draws on a market model of politics, 
where the dispersion of providers (parties or firms) is thought to provide a reasonable test of how 
open the market is and hence how efficient is it likely to be (Becker 1958). In a polity, however, 
goods are not provided by individual parties but rather by the party, or parties, who control the 
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executive. Since only a few – generally large – parties are in a position to occupy that policymaking 
role, smaller parties matter only insofar as they affect the behavior of those larger actors. Arguably, 
a measure of contestation should focus on the parties that matter most – for voters, for setting 
policy, and for achieving accountability. As a practical matter, sources do not consistently provide 
vote and seat totals for very small parties, so we cannot implement the party system approach in a 
comprehensive fashion.  
 Effective competition (Altman/Perez-Linan).  A more nuanced approach incorporates all parties 
but with concern for the relative coherence of government and opposition forces. In this vein, 
Altman & Pérez-Liñán (2002) develop an index of effective competition that is applied to eighteen 
Latin American polities from 1978 to 1996. Unfortunately, data is not available to extend this 
measure to a large sample of polity-years. 
Volatility.  Volatility is understood generally as the shift in votes or seats from one election 
to the next. High levels of volatility might conceivably strike fear in the hearts of politicians, 
increasing accountability. This aspect of contestation is captured to some extent in our incumbent-
challenger formula, but only in relation to the major parties. In any case, from the perspective of 
electoral accountability, volatility is an imperfect measure of contestation. At high levels of 
volatility, where party systems are constantly churning – with new parties arising and old parties 
falling in every electoral cycle – voters will find it difficult to exercise collective accountability and 
party leaders will tend to adopt very short time-horizons (Hicken 2018). Thus, we do not view 
volatility as an adequate measure of contestation.  
Comparisons.  In Table 3, we examine correlations between our incumbent-challenger 
formula and these alternatives. The latter are drawn directly from the cited studies and cover 
varying samples, dependent upon data coverage. Because some extant measures focus on votes 
and others on seats we include two indices based on the incumbent-challenger formula – the first 
focused on legislative and presidential votes and the second focused solely on legislative seats.  
It will be seen that Vanhanen’s measure of competition and Altman & Pérez-Liñán’s 
measure of effective competition are fairly highly correlated with the incumbent-challenger indices, 
indicating some degree of convergent validity. However, indices of effective parties and volatility 
are not well correlated, suggesting that these indices are measuring something quite different. 
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Table 3:  Alternate Indices of Electoral Contestation 
 Incumbent-Challenger formula 
 Legislative & Prez votes Legislative seats 
 Pearson’s r Polities Elections Pearson’s r Polities Elections 
Competition – votes (Vanhanen 2000) 0.80 169 2,343    
Effective parties – seats (Borman & Golder 2013)    0.10 124 1,168 
Effective competition – seats (Altman & Pérez-Liñán 2002)    0.62 21 178 
Volatility – seats (Mainwaring et al. 2017)    0.09 142 1,054 
Note:  Pearson’s r correlation between the incumbent-challenger indices of contestation based on (a) 
legislative/presidential votes and (b) legislative seats and four alternate indices of electoral contestation. 
 
 
III. Patterns of Contestation 
Having chosen a benchmark index – the incumbent-challenger index applied to legislative and 
presidential votes – we turn to the empirical record. What patterns of contestation obtain across 
polities and through time?  
 Of particular interest is the dispersion of election results during periods in which national 
elections are on course, i.e., excluding polities that have held no national elections as well as years 
prior to the first election in a polity and years in which the electoral system was interrupted (e.g., 
by a coup or foreign occupation). Polity-year data is displayed as a histogram in Figure 1, where 
the Y axis is percent and the X axis is our index of electoral contestation, divided into 5-point 
increments. 
The resulting curve is strongly bimodal. The first mode at 0-5, comprising roughly 9% of 
all polity-years, represents a setting in which the incumbent party wins all, or nearly all, of the 
votes. This may be regarded as strong prima facie evidence of autocracy.  
To the right of the first mode we find a substantial dropoff in frequency. It is uncommon 
for the incumbent-challenger differential to fall between 40 and 95% of the vote (5-60 on our 
index of electoral contestation). Where multi-party competition is allowed, huge wins for the 
incumbent are rare.  
Most of the electoral outcomes fall between 60 and 100 on our index, representing 
situations where the incumbent-challenger differential is between 0 and 40. The three highest bars, 
including nearly 30% of all the data points, represent situations in which the incumbent party 
narrowly retains its plurality status, winning up to 15% more votes than the next largest challenger. 
After 100, we find a dramatic fall in frequency. Note that a score of 100-110 represents a 
narrow loss for the incumbent party and a probable shift in control over the executive. There are 
two possible interpretations of the non-symmetrical distribution around 100. One might surmise 
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that incumbent parties are catering to their core constituencies, following a minimal-winning 
strategy (Riker 1962) and thereby eking out narrow victories. Alternatively, or additionally, one 
might surmise that incumbent parties are manipulating the electoral process just enough to stay in 
power. In any case, it bears emphasis that narrow wins for the incumbent are much more common 
than narrow losses. 
A final aspect of the histogram that deserves emphasis is the extremely thin right tail. Big 
losses for the incumbent are the rarest of all possible outcomes. This, too, is open to varying 
interpretations. It might be an indication of the stability of party ties. Since incumbents are likely 
to be entrenched in the electorate, it would be surprising if their support collapsed all of a sudden 
(from one election to the next). It might also be an indication of the advantages of incumbency, 
which serves as ballast even in contrary electoral tides. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Histogram of Contestation 
 
Note:  Histogram of contestation (incumbent-challenger), excluding polity-years prior to a polity’s first election or 
interregnums when elections are discontinued. 
 
To get a sense of how contestation varies over time, we graph the mean value of our index 
across all available polity-years from 1789 to the present. The long-term pattern depicted in Figure 
2 demonstrates that contestation has increased dramatically from the turn of the nineteenth 
century to the turn of the twenty-first century. Only one significant reversal is apparent, associated 
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with the fascist era in the 1940s. This lasts only a few years, after which contestation continues its 
ascent. A plateau appears from 1960-90 and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
The latter may reflect the achievement of an equilibrium, or it may be simply a pause in a longer 
secular-historical development. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Contestation through Time 
 
Note:  The solid line shows the number of countries for each year in the data set. The dashed line shows contestation 
(incumbent-challenger) through time, calculated as the polity-year mean across all polities for which data is available. 
 
 
Leaving aside global patterns, we turn to polity-specific patterns. One may suspect that for 
any given polity there exists an equilibrium – a level of contestation that is normal for that polity, 
given its structural endowments (whatever relatively fixed factors affect contestation). 
Accordingly, over time, as a polity gains experience with elections, one would expect election-to-
election variation in contestation to moderate. Players (both masses and elites) should learn the 
rules of the game and solve their coordination problems. Likewise, one would expect the rules of 
the game, including electoral system laws, to stabilize.  
To test this proposition, we graph year-to-year volatility in contestation (the first-difference 
of contestation) against the number of years a polity has held uninterrupted elections, transformed 
by the natural logarithm. Figure 3 supports the hypothesis of increasing institutionalization, with 
polities converging on a polity-level mean. This is confirmed by a statistical analysis in which the 
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first-difference of contestation is regressed against the number of consecutive elections (log) along 
with contestation (lagged), polity dummies, and year dummies, shown in Table B1. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Volatility across Elections
 
Note:  Y axis: volatility, measured as the first-difference of contestation (incumbent-challenger). X axis: number of 
consecutive (uninterrupted) legislative elections, transformed by the natural logarithm. 
 
 
IV. Analysis  
A positive relationship between population size and competitiveness has been found at district 
levels (Gerring et al. 2015). However, it is not at all clear that district-level findings can be 
extrapolated to national levels. At issue is not simply an aggregation problem but also very different 
samples and populations. Extant district-level analyses focus on a thin slice of contemporary 
nation-states and a handful of (highly unrepresentative) nation-states offering long-time series. 
They are also restricted to polities where a modicum of party competition exists. This study, by 
contrast, encompasses both the fact of contestation (the existence of multi-party elections) and 
the degree of contestation (the extent to which a single party or candidate is able to monopolize 
votes and seats, and prevent turnover). Consequently, the population of theoretical interest 
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includes all polities, democratic or autocratic. From this population, we draw a global sample of 
polities that is orders of magnitude larger (in polity-year coverage) than any district-level analysis. 
To test the proposition that size enhances contestation we regress our incumbent-
challenger index against population (transformed by the natural logarithm) in a global sample of 
polities, extending from 1789 to 2009. Definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for all 
variables are contained in Appendix A. Because the outcome is censored at 0, a tobit estimator is 
employed in benchmark models (Long & Freese 2014). Decade dummies are included to de-trend 
the data (year dummies are not tractable with a tobit estimator). Standard errors are clustered by 
polity in order to mitigate the serial correlation of errors.  
Because contestation is not a well-studied topic there is no standard statistical or theoretical 
model that identifies relevant covariates. Plausibly, the same factors that favor democracy might 
also foster contestation. Accordingly, specification tests in Table 4 draw on the substantial 
literature on democratization (Coppedge 2012). 
Model 1 includes per capita GDP (log), reflecting the modernization hypothesis (Knutsen 
et al. 2018) and a dummy for English colonial status (contemporary or former), reflecting the 
assumption that British colonies were more likely to foster elective assemblies (Bernhard et al. 
2004; Lange, Mahoney & Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Both factors may be regarded as 
exogenous, both have prima facie plausibility as causes, and both perform fairly well in subsequent 
tests. We regard this as the benchmark model. 
Model 2 includes the regressor of theoretical interest along with dummies for each region 
of the world – West Europe, East Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, MENA, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, North America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific, and the Caribbean. Regional 
fixed effects, although not theoretically informed, represent the possibility that contestation might 
be affected by historical and cultural factors specific to different regions and avoids any possibility 
of post-treatment confounding.  
Model 3 includes urbanization, a correlate of modernization, and a factor that may be 
correlated with population (in fact, the correlation is modest). Urbanization shows a strong 
relationship to contestation but is not robust in later tests. 
Model 4 includes dummy variables representing four major electoral system types: (a) 
majoritarian (the excluded category), (b) proportional, (c) mixed (majoritarian and proportional), 
and (d) other (single non-transferable voting, limited voting, et al). Bear in mind that although our 
outcome is votes, rather than seats, one may assume that the rules of the game condition choices 
by elites and voters, prompting both to act strategically (Cox 1997). Some electoral systems are apt 
to foster greater contestation than others. Indeed, proportional electoral systems foster higher 
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cntestation than majoritarian electoral systems, as expected. We do not include this in the 
benchmark because of possible endogeneity relative to the factor of theoretical interest. 
Model 5 includes a measure of democracy, the Lexical index of electoral democracy. This 
is an important covariate insofar as we want to distinguish contestation from democratization. On 
the other hand, the two concepts are interwoven (as discussed), and it is by no means clear that 
democracy should be regarded as a “cause” of contestation. Thus, we do not retain democracy in 
the benchmark model.  
Model 6 includes measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization, factors 
often regarded as causes of democracy (Gerring et al. 2018). Results are mixed, with ethnic 
fractionalization showing a negative relationship to contestation, religious fractionalization 
showing a positive relationship, and linguistic fractionalization showing no consistent relationship. 
Bear in mind that our theory rests on the number of different social identities within a society, while 
fractionalization indices measure their distribution. Our theory is also agnostic on what sorts of 
identities might be relevant for politics. They might be ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, 
social class, region, or some mixture of the above, and the features that matter will surely vary 
from time to time and place to place. Thus, the mixed results for these common predictors of 
democracy does not speak directly on our theory. Fractionalization indices might be regarded as 
background covariates, but not causal mechanisms. Because they are also likely to be endogenous 
to the aggregate size of a society we exclude them from the benchmark specification. 
Model 7, a kitchen-sink specification, includes all of the foregoing factors. By virtue of list-
wise deletion, this sample includes only sovereign countries, alleviating concerns that our results 
might be driven by the inclusion of colonies and dependencies. 
The final test, shown in Model 8, addresses potential problems of causal inference through 
an instrumental-variable design. We identify two instruments that strongly affect the population 
of a polity – territorial size (log) and agricultural suitability. The critical assumption is that these 
factors have no direct effect on contestation conditional on observed covariates – which, we note, 
includes per capita GDP. We regard this as a plausible, though not unimpeachable, assumption. 
In any case, the coefficient estimate is very close to the benchmark model.  
Results across the eight models presented in Table 4 reveal estimates for population that 
are remarkably stable, suggesting that the observed relationship is not a product of idiosyncratic 
choices in model specification. By contrast, estimates for background covariates are not especially 
robust, though generally signed in the expected direction.  
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Table 4:  Tobit Models 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  6.047*** 5.946*** 3.981** 8.378*** 2.901*** 2.848* 5.835***  7.797** 
   (log) (1.680) (1.407) (1.899) (1.779) (0.904) (1.551) (1.196)  (3.301) 
GDP pc (log) 21.913***  17.274*** 24.59*** 4.311*** 16.79*** 2.153 -.0690 22.758*** 
 (2.445)  (3.405) (2.339) (1.542) (2.903) (2.636) (0.085) (2.585) 
English colony 18.731**  19.148***  25.03*** 6.718* 11.01 13.88*** 0.038 13.408* 
 (7.642)  (6.300) (8.116) (3.524) (7.406) (4.688) (0.234) (8.076) 
Urbanization   49.204***    5.889   
   (18.215)    (10.28)   
Latitude (log)       -5.199**   
       (2.181)   
Oil income pc       9.029   
       (5.659)   
Years indep (log)       -0.00449**   
       (0.00184)   
Protestant       -0.230   
       (1.081)   
Muslim       0.0946   
       (0.0602)   
Island       0.0368   
       (0.0728)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -40.15*** -25.50**   
      (14.75) (10.96)   
  Religious       34.20** 17.89**   
      (14.71) (9.061)   
  Linguistic       -7.787 6.782   
      (13.28) (10.84)   
Lexical index     17.09***  13.63***   
     (0.864)  (0.844)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    16.38**   8.886**   
    (7.435)   (4.043)   
  Mixed    13.94*   3.951   
    (7.450)   (5.870)   
  Other    -10.69   -37.43***   
    (24.91)   (12.61)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.627***  
        (0.061)  
   Agricultural         2.192***  
      suitability        (0.392)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 57.16*** 50.12*** 50.74*** 52.75*** 36.28*** 50.69*** 33.91***   
 (2.189) (1.662) (2.331) (1.612) (1.156) (2.333) (1.323)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 191 177 142 164 
Years 226 227 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,068 21,068 11,502 18,796 14,351 12,944 7,947 18,601 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.122 0.046 0.099 0.128 0.045 0.109  
Chi2        421.42 
Note.  Outcome: contestation (incumbent-challenger).  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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In Appendix B, analyses performed in Table 4 for the incumbent-challenger index are 
replicated for the five other indices of contestation presented in Table 2. These analyses show very 
similar results, demonstrating that the relationship between population and contestation is robust 
with various formulas and using votes or seats as measures of party performance. Across all these 
tests population is a robust predictor of contestation, while other factors are less consistent.  
Taken together, the tests shown in Table 4 and Appendix B suggest that among the 
theoretically plausible causes of contestation, population is the only strong and consistent 
predictor. Of course, there may be other causal factors that we have not managed to identify or to 
properly measure. And there may be causal relationships among the chosen regressors that appear 
only in certain contexts – delimited by cultural, historical, political, economic scope-conditions 
that further study may identify. We do not wish to over-interpret these results. Still, it is remarkable 
that many of the purported causes of democracy do not apply – at least, not consistently or strongly 
– to electoral contestation. 
To gain a sense for the significance of this relationship, Figure 4 graphs predicted values 
for contestation as population varies, based on Model 1 in Table 4, with covariates set to their 
sample means. Note that values below zero refer to the values that (according to the tobit 
estimator) would have been realized if the scale were not truncated. Note also that because of the 
logged scale, the impact of population on contestation is much greater at lower levels of population 
than at higher levels. For example, an increase in population from one hundred thousand to one 
million is associated with a (roughly) 20-point increase in contestation. This is equivalent to an 
increase from 10,000 to 100,000 (on the low end) or 10 million to 100 million (on the high end). 
In any case, the effect is non-trivial. Larger polities generate considerably higher levels of party 
competition. 
To test this hypothesis in a more disaggregated fashion we explore a series of sample 
restrictions in Table 5. Model 1 focuses on the nineteenth century while Model 2 focuses on the 
twentieth century. Strikingly, the relationship between population and contestation appears to be 
much stronger in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth century. However, the historical 
sample is much smaller than the contemporary sample and there is less variation in the variables 
of theoretical interest, so it is difficult to know whether it provides adequate grounds for 
generalization. 
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Figure 4:  Predicted Values 
 
Note:  Predicted values for contestation (incumbent-challenger) as population changes, based on Model 1, Table 2, 
holding other variables at their means, surrounded by a 95% confidence interval.  
 
 Model 3 excludes polity-years for which contestation is zero, presenting an analyses based 
only on positive values (as displayed in Figure 1). Model 4 transforms the contestation index into 
a binary index, coded as 0 (no contestation) or 1 (some contestation). In this fashion, we 
disaggregate the two elements of the index. Both analyses show a positive relationship to 
population, though it is considerably weaker when disaggregated in this fashion. 
In Table B2, we test the sensitivity of the benchmark model by excluding specific regions 
of the world. Here, we find relatively little variation in the performance of population, for which 
estimates vary only by a few points across models. Apparently, our analysis is not subject to 
influential regions. 
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Table 5:  Sample Restrictions 
Estimator Tobit Tobit OLS OLS 
Outcome Contestation Contestation Contestation Contestation(0/1) 
Sample Year<1900 Year>1900 Contestation(>0) All 
 1 2 3 4 
Population 34.758*** 3.397** 2.676*** 0.024** 
   (log) (7.719) (1.315) (0.764) (0.011) 
Polities 92 197 156 186 
Years 111 114 215 226 
Obs 6,842 14,152 9,221 18,228 
R2 0.110 0.038 0.201 0.355 
Note:  Outcome: contestation (incumbent-challenger).  Restricted to 
positive values in Model 3 and re-coded as a binary variable in Model 4.  
All models include per capita GDP (log), English colony, and decade 
dummies.  Model 3 also includes electoral system dummies.  Coefficients 
and standard errors (clustered by polity) shown only for the variable of 
theoretical interest.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  
Constant omitted. 
 
 In Table 6, we approach the question with time-series models, using a linear (ordinary least 
squares) estimator along with polity and year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by polity, as 
previously. Model 1 follows the benchmark specification (excluding English colony, which is time-
invariant). Model 2 includes only the regressor of theoretical interest, population. Model 3 
substitutes urbanization for GDP. Model 4 returns to the benchmark specification, this time with 
a ten-year (rather than one-year) lag between right- and left-side variables. Model 5 introduces a 
lagged dependent variable.  
All models show a robust association between population and contestation. Note also that 
the estimate from Model 1 tracks the estimate from the benchmark analysis (Model 1, Table 4) 
very closely. Importantly, the fixed-effect framework alleviates concerns about confounders 
stemming from static features of each polity (e.g., geography, culture, pre-modern history). The 
robustness of the relationship with different lag structures, as well as with a lagged dependent 
variable, suggests that simultaneity (between right- and left-sides of the model) is unlikely to pose 
a problem. 
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Table 6:  Fixed-effect Models 
Right-side lag (years) 1 1 1 10 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Population (log) 6.443** 4.373* 13.337*** 6.831** 0.964** 
 (2.530) (2.364) (3.491) (2.631) (0.408) 
GDP pc (log) 5.846***   4.443** 0.496* 
 (1.706)   (1.475) (0.256) 
Dependent variable     0. 861*** 
    (lagged)     (0.008) 
Urbanization   -1.767   
   (18.233)   
Polities 197 197 163 196 196 
Years 226 227 109 219 225 
Obs. 21,083 21,083 11,545 19,949 20,802 
R2 0.336 0.399 0.076 0.312 0.904 
Note:  Outcome: contestation (incumbent-challenger).  Estimator: ordinary least squares with polity and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by polity in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Constant omitted. 
 
 
V. Discussion 
In this study, we introduce a new index of electoral contestation. The proposed formula 
encompasses several dimensions of contestation – the size of the incumbent party, the size of the 
largest challenger, as well as turnover in the pole position (the largest party) – and thus provides a 
more complete measure of this complex concept than existing indices. This measure is applied to 
polities from 1789 (or year of independence) to the present, producing a comprehensive dataset 
of electoral contestation extending to nearly 36,000 polity-year observations. 
 We also put forth an explanation for why some polities achieve higher contestation than 
others. This explanation rests on demography. Larger polities, we argue, are more likely to adopt 
multi-party elections as a mechanism for choosing rulers and the electoral arena is more likely to 
be highly contested. 
We reiterate that contestation is not a proxy for democracy but nonetheless constitutes an 
important dimension of that nebulous concept. Readers may wonder what other functions an 
index of contestation performs. A wealth of studies, referenced at the outset, suggest that 
contestation fosters better governance. However, these studies focus almost exclusively at 
subnational levels – at regions or electoral districts. It remains to be seen whether electoral 
contestation has a positive impact on governance at national levels. We view this as an important 
agenda for future research. 
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Table A1:  Variable Definitions 
Left-side Variables 
 
Incumbent-challenger, votes, parl.  100 – (vote share of the incumbent in legislative elections – vote 
share of the challenger in legislative elections). The incumbent is the largest party in the previous 
elections. If it is the first democratic election of a polity or the incumbent is not among the top three 
parties of the most recent election the largest party of the current election is included in the formula 
instead. The challenger is the second largest party if the incumbent is again the largest party or if it is 
the first democratic election in a polity or the incumbent is not among the top three parties anymore. If 
the incumbent is the second or third largest party in the election then the challenger is the largest party. 
Source: authors.  Scale: interval. contestation_vote 
Incumbent-challenger, seats, parl.  100 – (seat share of the incumbent – seat share of the challenger). 
The incumbent is the largest party in the previous elections. If it is the first democratic election of a 
polity or the incumbent is not among the top three parties of the most recent election the largest party 
of the current election is included in the formula instead. The challenger is the second largest party if 
the incumbent is again the largest party or if it is the first democratic election in a polity or the 
incumbent is not among the top three parties anymore. If the incumbent is the second or third largest 
party in the election then the challenger is the largest party. Source: authors.  Scale: interval. 
contestation_seat2   
Incumbent-challenger, votes, pres.  100 – (vote share of the incumbent in presidential elections – vote 
share of the challenger in presidential elections). The incumbent is the largest party in the previous 
elections. If it is the first democratic election of a polity or the incumbent is not among the top three 
parties of the most recent election the largest party of the current election is included in the formula 
instead. The challenger is the second largest party if the incumbent is again the largest party or if it is 
the first democratic election in a polity or the incumbent is not among the top three parties anymore. If 
the incumbent is the second or third largest party in the election then the challenger is the largest party. 
Source: authors.  Scale: interval. pres_contestation_vote   
Incumbent-challenger, combined.  This is the benchmark variable in our paper. It is a combined 
version of Incumbent-challenger, votes, parl. and Incumbent-challenger, votes, pres. The variable takes 
the average of presidential and legislative contestation when both are taking place in a country.  
Largest-party, votes, parl.  100 – vote share of the largest party in a legislative election. Source: authors.  
Scale: interval.  v2ellovtlg_100 
Largest-party, seats, parl.  100 – seat share of the largest party in a legislative election. Source: authors.  
Scale: interval.  v2ellostsl_100 
Largest-party, votes, pres.  100 – vote share of the largest party in a presidential election. Source: 
authors.  Scale: interval.  v2elvotlrg_100 
Top two parties, votes, parl.  100 – (vote share of the largest party – vote share of the second largest 
party) in a legislative election. Source: authors.  Scale: interval. contestation_top2   
Top two parties, seats, parl.  100 – (seat share of the largest party – seat share of the second largest 
party) in a legislative election. Source: authors.  Scale: interval.  contestation_seat_top2 
Top two parties, votes, pres.  100 – (vote share of the largest party – vote share of the second largest 
party) in a presidential election. Source: authors.  Scale: interval.  pres_contestation_top2 
 
Right-side Variables 
 
Agricultural suitability.  Geographic endowments favoring agricultural production including climate, 
soil, and terrain.  Source: Agro-Ecological Zones system (GAEZ), developed by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), downloaded (October 2017) from 
http://gaez.fao.org/Main.html#.  Scale: logarithmic. suita_GAEZ_ln 
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English colony  Former English colony.  Source: Authors.  Scale: binary. English_legal_origin 
Fractionalization, Ethnic.  Herfindahl index of fractionalization. Specifically, the probability of two 
randomly chosen people belonging to the same ethnic group.  Source: Alesina et al. (2003).  Scale: 
interval.  al_ethnic  
Fractionalization, Religious. Herfindahl index of fractionalization. Specifically, the probability of two 
randomly chosen people belonging to the same religious group.  Source: Alesina et al. (2003).  Scale: 
interval. al_religion 
Fractionalization, Linguistic. Herfindahl index of fractionalization. Specifically, the probability of two 
randomly chosen people belonging to the same linguistic group.  Source: Alesina et al. (2003).  Scale: 
interval. al_language 
GDP per cap.  Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars, based on data from the 
Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Bairoch (1976), 
Broadberry (2015), Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), and the WDI (World Bank 2016), 
which are combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model.  Source: Fariss et al. (2017).  
Scale: logarithmic.  Maddison_gdppc_1990_estimate_ln 
Land area.  Land area of polity. Source: Agro-Ecological Zones system (GAEZ), developed by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), downloaded (October 2017) from 
http://gaez.fao.org/Main.html#.  Extra data linearly imputed with data from WDI (World Bank 2016).  
Scale: logarithmic.  area_GAEZ_ln_imp 
Latitude.  Distance from equator.  Source: QoG (Teorell et al. 2016).  Scale: logarithmic.  Latitude_ln 
Lexical index of electoral democracy.  An ordinal index measuring the electoral components of 
democracy in a cumulative fashion. That is, to qualify for a given level (0-6) all previous conditions 
must be satisfied.  0 = No elections. (Elections are not held for any policymaking offices. This includes 
situations in which elections are postponed indefinitely or the constitutional timing of elections is 
violated in a more than marginal fashion.)  1 = Elections with no parties or only one party. (There are 
regular elections but they are non-partisan or only a single party or party grouping is allowed to 
participate.)  2 = Multi-party elections for legislature. (Opposition parties are allowed to participate in 
legislative elections and to take office.)  3 = Multi-party elections for executive. (The executive is 
chosen directly or indirectly – by an elected legislature – through elections.  4 = Minimally competitive 
elections for both executive and legislature. (The chief executive offices and the seats in the effective 
legislative body are – directly or indirectly – filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning 
that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to win government power.)  
5 = Male or female suffrage. (Virtually all adult male or female citizens are allowed to vote in elections.)  
6 = Universal suffrage. (Virtually all adult citizens are allowed to vote in elections.)  Source: Skaaning, 
Gerring & Bartusevičius (2015).  Scale: ordinal.  lexical_index 
Muslim.  Percentage of population that claims to be Muslim in 1980. Source:  La Porta et al. (1999). Scale: 
binary. Muslim 
Oil wealth.  The aggregated real value of a polity’s petroleum production, as a share of total population. 
Source:  Haber & Menaldo (2011).  Scale: interval.  e_Total_Oil_Income_PC 
Polyarchy.  Electoral democracy index.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018; Teorell et al. 2016).  Scale: 
interval.  v2x_polyarchy 
Population.  Official population of a polity, counting only those acknowledged as citizens. This is based 
on data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from 
Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), Singer et al. (1972), and WDI (World Bank 2016), which 
are combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model.  Source: Fariss et al. (2017).  Scale: 
logarithmic.  Maddison_pop_estimate_ln 
Protestant.  Percentage of population that claims to be part of a Protestant denomination in 1980. Source:  
La Porta et al. (1999).  lp_protmg80 
Regions.  A vector of dummies: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Mongolia), Latin America, 
Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North America, East Asia, 
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South-East Asia, South Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.  Source: QoG (Teorell et al. 2013).  Scale: 
nominal.  e_regionpol 
Urbanization.  Share of population living in urban areas (%).  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018).  
Scale: interval.  e_miurbani 
Years independent (log). Years since formal independence (logged).  Source: authors.  Scale: logarithmic. 
indep_yrs_since_ln 
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Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
(1) 100 – (Inc. – chall.), votes, combined 35,814 22.66 0 38.55 0 190 
(2) 100 – (Inc. – chall.), votes, parl. 34,812 22.34 0 39.41 0 190 
(3) 100 – (Inc. – chall.), seats, parl. 36,585 23.03 0 38.85 0 193.4 
(4) 100 – largest party, votes, combined  36,198 13.65 0 23.73 0 124.79 
(5) 100 – largest party, votes, parl. 35,005 14.21 0 25.16 0 93.50 
(6) 100 – largest party, seats, parl. 36,871 14.08 0 24.03 0 99.53 
(7) 100 – Top Two, votes, combined 36,038 21.95 0 36.34 0 124.7 
(8) 100 – Top Two, votes, parl. 35,005 21.77 0 36.90 0 124.7 
(9) 100 – Top Two, seats, parl. 36,660 21.56 0 34.94 0 100 
       
Urbanization 15,562 0.349 0.296 0.247 0.00787 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 19,514 0.437 0.431 0.258 0 0.930 
Religious fractionalization 43,319 0.438 0.463 0.232 0.00229 0.860 
GDP pc (log) 26,479 7.624 7.397 1.155 3.868 14.40 
Lexical index 17,154 2.915 3 2.352 0 6 
Region 47,838 4.433 4 2.602 1 10 
Agricultural Suitability 35,260 0.419 0.438 0.266 0 0.965 
Linguistic fractionalization 19,891 0.387 0.357 0.284 0.00211 0.923 
Protestant 44,499 14.29 2.800 21.70 0 97.80 
Years indep (log) 43,296 1.564 0 2.256 0 7.574 
English colony 47,838 0.348 0 0.476 0 1 
Muslim 42,863 23.42 1.200 36.04 0 99.90 
Area (log) 44,255 11.22 11.69 2.789 2.227 18.36 
Population (log) 26,284 15.04 15.11 1.931 7.507 21.38 
Latitude (log) 42,728 -1.591 -1.496 0.938 -4.500 -0.325 
Oil income pc 14,399 344.0 0 2,666 0 78,589 
Electoral System 36,624 0.475 0 0.725 0 3 
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Table A3:  Principal components (eigenvectors), all measures  
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 8.55033 8.35346 0.95 0.95 
Comp2 0.19687 0.0426093 0.0219 0.9719 
Comp3 0.15426 0.100744 0.0171 0.9891 
Comp4 0.053516 0.0332166 0.0059 0.995 
Comp5 0.0202994 0.00754942 0.0023 0.9973 
Comp6 0.01275 0.00618389 0.0014 0.9987 
Comp7 0.00656607 0.00290478 0.0007 0.9994 
Comp8 0.00366129 0.00191608 0.0004 0.9998 
Comp9 0.00174521 . 0.0002 1 
 
 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Comp8 Comp9 
1 0.3357 -0.2542 0.3355 0.0766 -0.2158 -0.5759 -0.0736 -0.4301 0.3683 
2 0.3352 -0.2198 0.3872 0.1605 -0.3747 -0.1749 -0.3058 0.5401 0.3276 
3 0.3257 0.3967 0.6053 0.1561 0.1390 0.4862 0.2816 -0.1037 -0.0068 
4 0.3347 -0.2235 -0.3305 0.3567 0.6028 0.2563 -0.1806 0.3338 -0.1689 
5 0.3356 -0.1647 -0.3325 0.3999 -0.4479 0.2529 -0.0719 -0.5357 0.1819 
6 0.3268 0.5612 -0.3435 0.2139 -0.1096 -0.4594 0.3779 0.2177 -0.0335 
7 0.3367 -0.2784 -0.0946 -0.4418 0.2791 -0.0592 0.3979 -0.0862 0.5982 
8 0.3372 -0.2368 -0.0975 -0.4463 -0.3678 0.2355 0.2360 0.2022 -0.5781 
9 0.3321 0.4518 -0.1217 -0.4656 0.0674 0.0409 -0.6535 -0.1359 0.0480 
 
Number of obs. = 34,697,  Number of comp. = 9; Trace = 9; Rotation: (unrotated = principal); Rho = 1.0000 
  
 
 
39 
Table A4:  Full Dataset 
Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year 
Afghanistan 1789 2014 Chile 1789 2013 
Albania 1789 2017 China 1789 2017 
Algeria 1789 2017 Colombia 1789 2014 
Andorra 1993 2015 Comoros 1789 2016 
Angola 1789 2012 Congo DR 1789 2011 
Antigua and Barbuda 1789 2014 Congo, Republic of 1789 2016 
Argentina 1789 2015 Costa Rica 1789 2014 
Armenia 1919 2017 Croatia 1941 2016 
Australia 1789 2016 Cuba 1789 2013 
Austria 1789 2016 Cyprus 1789 2016 
Azerbaijan 1995 2015 Czech Republic 1918 2013 
Bahamas 1956 2017 Denmark 1789 2015 
Bahrain 1789 2001 Djibouti 1789 2016 
Bangladesh 1789 2014 Dominica 1789 2014 
Barbados 1951 2013 Dominican Republic 1789 2016 
Belarus 1994 2016 Ecuador 1789 2013 
Belgium 1789 2014 Egypt 1789 2015 
Belize 1789 2015 El Salvador 1789 2015 
Benin 1789 2016 Equatorial Guinea 1789 2016 
Bhutan 1789 2013 Eritrea 1789 2017 
Bolivia 1789 2014 Estonia 1918 2016 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990 2014 Ethiopia 1789 2015 
Botswana 1789 2014 Fiji 1789 2014 
Brazil 1789 2014 Finland 1809 2015 
Brunei 1789 2017 France 1795 2017 
Bulgaria 1878 2016 Gabon 1789 2016 
Burkina Faso 1789 2015 Gambia 1789 2017 
Burma 1789 2015 Georgia 1919 2016 
Burundi 1789 2015 German Democratic Republic 1945 1990 
Cambodia 1789 2013 Germany 1789 2013 
Cameroon 1789 2013 Ghana 1789 2016 
Canada 1789 2015 Greece 1822 2015 
Cape Verde 1789 2016 Grenada 1789 2013 
Central African Republic 1789 2016 Guatemala 1789 2015 
Chad 1789 2016 Guinea 1789 2015 
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Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year 
Guinea Bissau 1789 2014 Malaysia 1789 2013 
Guyana 1789 2015 Maldives 1789 2014 
Haiti 1789 2016 Mali 1789 2013 
Honduras 1789 2013 Malta 1789 2017 
Hong Kong 1789 2016 Marshall Islands 1789 1976 
Hungary 1789 2014 Mauritania 1789 2014 
Iceland 1789 2016 Mauritius 1789 2014 
India 1789 2014 Mexico 1789 2015 
Indonesia 1789 2014 Micronesia 1789 1978 
Iran 1789 2016 Moldova 1994 2014 
Iraq 1789 2014 Monaco 1789 2013 
Ireland 1918 2016 Mongolia 1789 2016 
Israel 1948 2015 Montenegro 1789 2016 
Italy 1861 2013 Morocco 1789 2016 
Ivory Coast 1789 2016 Mozambique 1789 2014 
Jamaica 1865 2016 Namibia 1789 2014 
Japan 1789 2014 Nauru 1789 1950 
Jordan 1789 2006 Nepal 1789 2013 
Kazakhstan 1999 2016 Netherlands 1789 2017 
Kenya 1789 2013 New Zealand 1789 2014 
Kiribati 1789 2016 Nicaragua 1789 2016 
Kosovo 1789 2014 Niger 1789 2016 
Kuwait 1789 1989 Nigeria 1789 2015 
Kyrgyzstan 1995 2015 North Korea 1945 2014 
Laos 1789 1988 Norway 1789 2013 
Latvia 1920 2014 Oman 1789 1999 
Lebanon 1789 1942 Pakistan 1789 2013 
Lesotho 1789 2015 Palau 1789 2016 
Liberia 1789 2011 Palestine (West Bank) 1948 2017 
Libya 1789 2017 Panama 1789 2014 
Liechtenstein 1789 2017 Papua New Guinea 1789 2012 
Lithuania 1918 2016 Paraguay 1811 2013 
Luxembourg 1815 2013 Peru 1789 2016 
Macedonia 1990 2016 Philippines 1789 2016 
Madagascar 1789 2013 Poland 1789 2015 
Malawi 1789 2014 Portugal 1789 2016 
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Country First Year Last Year Country First Year Last Year 
Qatar 1789 2017 Sweden 1887 2014 
Romania 1789 2016 Switzerland 1789 2015 
Russia 1789 2016 Syria 1789 2017 
Rwanda 1789 2013 Taiwan 1789 2016 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1789 2015 Tajikistan 1991 2015 
Samoa 1789 2016 Tanzania 1789 1960 
San Marino 1789 2016 Thailand 1789 2014 
Sao Tome and Principe 1789 2016 Timor Leste 1789 2017 
Saudi Arabia 1789 2017 Togo 1789 2015 
Senegal 1789 2012 Tonga 1789 2014 
Serbia 1804 2016 Trinidad and Tobago 1789 2015 
Seychelles 1789 2016 Tunisia 1789 2014 
Sierra Leone 1789 2012 Turkey 1789 2015 
Singapore 1867 2015 Turkmenistan 1994 2012 
Slovakia 1938 2016 Tuvalu 1789 1976 
Slovenia 1989 2014 Uganda 1789 2016 
Solomon Islands 1789 2014 Ukraine 1991 2014 
Somalia 1789 2016 United Arab Emirates 1789 2005 
Somaliland 1789 2010 United Kingdom 1832 2015 
South Africa 1789 2014 United States 1794 2016 
South Korea 1789 2016 Uruguay 1789 2014 
South Sudan 1789 2017 Uzbekistan 1789 2016 
South Yemen 1789 2017 Vanuatu 1789 2016 
Spain 1789 2016 Venezuela 1789 2015 
Sri Lanka 1789 2015 Vietnam 1789 2016 
St Kitts and Nevis 1789 2015 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 1789 1975 
St Lucia 1789 2016 Yemen 1789 2017 
Sudan 1789 2015 Zambia 1789 2016 
Suriname 1789 2015 Zimbabwe 1789 2013 
Swaziland 1789 2013 
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Online Appendix B:  Robustness Tests 
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Table B1:  Volatility across Elections 
 1 
Consecutive elections (log) -10.249*** 
(1.544) 
Lagged DV 0.989*** 
(0.20) 
Polities 153 
Years 221 
Obs. 2,359 
R2 0.434 
 
Outcome: contestation (incumbent-challenger), differenced.  Estimator: ordinary least squares with polity and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by polity in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Constant omitted. 
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Table B2:  Sample Restriction by Region 
Excluded region West Europe 
East Europe 
Central Asia 
Latin 
America MENA 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
North 
America 
East 
Asia 
Southeast 
Asia 
South 
Asia Pacific 
Caribb- 
ean 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Population 4.490** 6.375*** 6.656*** 4.821*** 6.113*** 5.551*** 6.796*** 5.823*** 6.271*** 6.692*** 7.170*** 
   (log) (1.932) (1.794) (1.767) (1.544) (1.884) (1.828) (1.574) (1.684) (1.818) (1.788) (1.816) 
Polities 174 185 177 176 148 194 191 191 189 184 185 
Years 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Obs 17,688 18,953 17,921 18,216 17,145 20,044 20,111 19,441 20,147 20,722 20,263 
R2 0.095 0.087 0.091 0.087 0.087 0.090 0.087 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.090 
 
Outcome: contestation (incumbent-challenger).  All models include per capita GDP (log) and decade dummies.  Estimator: tobit regression, coefficients and standard 
errors (clustered by polity) shown only for the variable of theoretical interest.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B3:  Incumbent-challenger formula applied to legislative seats 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  7.577*** 6.624*** 4.768*** 9.454*** 3.980*** 4.218*** 4.605***  7.631** 
   (log) (1.648) (1.390) (1.828) (1.686) (1.052) (1.510) (1.380)  (3.196) 
GDP pc (log) 21.547***  16.889*** 23.62*** 5.152*** 16.11*** -0.233 -0.069 21.819*** 
 (2.236)  (3.316) (2.229) (1.555) (2.498) (2.855) (0.084) (2.401) 
English colony 9.518  9.394  15.25** -4.053 0.299 -0.114 0.039 6.060 
 (7.680)  (6.154) (7.755) (3.994) (6.652) (3.697) (0.244) (8.076) 
Urbanization   38.459**    -5.172   
   (18.942)    (11.44)   
Latitude (log)       -3.852   
       (2.530)   
Island       -4.102   
       (6.115)   
Oil income pc       0.000550   
       (0.000798)   
Years indep (log)       -0.615   
       (0.937)   
Protestant       0.00166   
       (0.0489)   
Muslim       -0.0292   
       (0.0817)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -41.67*** -4.607   
      (12.57) (9.328)   
  Religious       36.08*** 39.26***   
      (12.72) (9.677)   
  Linguistic       -2.717 -7.093   
      (10.80) (7.987)   
Lexical index     16.31***  13.65***   
     (0.849)  (0.789)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    13.22*   2.634   
    (6.767)   (4.089)   
  Mixed    6.579   -2.851   
    (6.468)   (4.978)   
  Other    -9.210   -5.466   
    (19.57)   (18.15)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.627***  
        (0.061)  
   Agricultural         2.192***  
      Suitability        (0.392)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 55.94*** 49.43*** 50.88*** 52.53*** 38.78*** 50.43*** 36.19***   
 (1.854) (1.494) (1.971) (1.493) (1.156) (1.878) (1.251)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 192 177 143 164 
Years 227 226 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,721 21,721 11,817 19,320 14,536 13,425 8,082 19,001 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.111 0.040 0.089 0.107 0.040 0.088  
Chi2        468.35 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the incumbent-challenger formula applied to seats won in 
elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B4:  Largest-party formula applied to legislative votes 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  5.244*** 4.653*** 3.622*** 6.740*** 2.921*** 3.015*** 5.075***  4.697** 
   (log) (1.110) (0.937) (1.386) (1.203) (0.652) (1.099) (1.018)  (2.161) 
GDP pc (log) 15.94***  13.16*** 17.13*** 3.129*** 12.29*** 1.171 -0.073 16.097*** 
 (1.711)  (2.524) (1.688) (1.145) (2.140) (2.161) (0.085) (1.830) 
English colony 10.81**  10.24** 17.47*** -0.244 5.169 8.679** 0.000 7.304 
 (4.647)  (4.330) (5.296) (2.118) (5.092) (3.757) (0.236) (5.121) 
Urbanization   29.79**    0.378   
   (12.53)    (8.775)   
Latitude (log)       -4.376**   
       (1.897)   
Island       5.227   
       (4.803)   
Oil income pc       -0.00279*   
       (0.00143)   
Years indep (log)       -1.054   
       (0.864)   
Protestant       0.193***   
       (0.0480)   
Muslim       0.0856   
       (0.0692)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -38.11*** -16.12   
      (9.820) (10.07)   
  Religious       17.34* 6.840   
      (10.33) (7.311)   
  Linguistic       7.730 11.81   
      (8.932) (8.626)   
Lexical index     11.76***  9.289***   
     (0.606)  (0.593)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    15.80***   7.999**   
    (5.439)   (3.306)   
  Mixed    12.66**   4.306   
    (5.448)   (4.245)   
  Other    -4.775   -22.41***   
    (18.81)   (8.124)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.631***  
        (0.061)  
   Agricultural         2.198***  
      suitability        (0.396)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 39.06*** 34.38*** 35.65*** 36.09*** 24.80*** 35.11*** 22.49***   
 (1.639) (1.320) (1.765) (1.320) (1.137) (1.688) (1.252)   
Polities 196 196 162 165 188 176 141 163 
Years 226 226 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 20,277 20,277 10,904 18,037 13,511 12,364 7,465 17,852 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.139 0.055 0.119 0.147 0.053 0.132  
Chi2        349.24 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the largest-party formula applied to votes in elections to 
the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B5:  Largest-party formula applied to legislative seats 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  5.220*** 4.596*** 2.975** 6.183*** 2.705*** 2.934*** 2.599**  4.007** 
   (log) (0.990) (0.866) (1.203) (1.008) (0.671) (0.958) (1.082)  (1.901) 
GDP pc (log) 14.11***  10.59*** 15.29*** 3.652*** 10.59*** -2.807 -.062 14.441*** 
 (1.483)  (2.373) (1.572) (1.103) (1.707) (2.231) (0.085) (1.561) 
English colony 3.797  3.577 8.162* -7.486*** -2.371 -3.000 0.053 0.892 
 (4.399)  (4.070) (4.689) (2.191) (4.354) (3.852) (0.244) (4.714) 
Urbanization   32.36**    7.883   
   (12.86)    (9.135)   
Latitude (log)       -1.868   
       (2.020)   
Oil income pc       -2.540   
       (4.173)   
Years indep (log)       8.45e-05   
       (0.000611)   
Protestant       -1.438*   
       (0.770)   
Muslim       0.116***   
       (0.0417)   
       -0.0574   
       (0.0691)   
Fractionalization       2.824   
  Ethnic       -29.77*** 2.824   
      (8.444) (8.263)   
  Religious       18.22** 22.17**   
      (8.597) (9.812)   
  Linguistic       4.391 -0.162   
      (7.587) (6.521)   
Lexical index     10.68***  8.810***   
     (0.576)  (0.561)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    11.55**   4.503   
    (4.521)   (3.275)   
  Mixed    5.649   0.589   
    (4.432)   (3.214)   
  Other    3.194   4.910   
    (13.70)   (11.57)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.628***  
        (0.060)  
   Agricultural         2.170***  
      suitability        (0.381)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 37.46*** 33.53*** 34.52*** 35.48*** 26.36*** 33.77*** 24.08***   
 (1.335) (1.247) (1.533) (1.206) (1.099) (1.424) (1.221)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 192 177 143 164 
Years 227 227 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,925 21,925 12,014 19,517 14,677 13,607 8,192 19,181 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.114 0.046 0.094 0.116 0.043 0.104  
Chi2        390.29 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the largest-party formula applied to seats won in elections 
to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B6:  Top-two formula applied to legislative votes 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  6.529*** 5.896*** 4.293** 8.810*** 3.038*** 3.127** 6.297***  7.192** 
   (log) (1.693) (1.358) (1.820) (1.789) (0.942) (1.533) (1.294)  (3.257) 
GDP pc (log) 22.01***  17.25*** 24.07*** 4.520*** 17.17*** 3.401 -.0725 21.993*** 
 (2.377)  (3.265) (2.239) (1.507) (2.887) (2.611) (0.085) (2.586) 
English colony 18.20**  17.25*** 25.13*** 5.256 8.027 9.647** 0.003 14.067* 
 (7.417)  (5.979) (7.838) (3.634) (7.023) (4.263) (0.235) (7.947) 
Urbanization   40.42**    2.847   
   (17.11)    (9.916)   
Latitude (log)       -8.269***   
       (2.044)   
Oil income pc       10.12**   
       (4.304)   
Years indep (log)       -0.00238*   
       (0.00134)   
Protestant       -1.150   
       (0.993)   
Muslim       0.168***   
       (0.0536)   
       0.0513   
       (0.0713)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -42.66*** -19.45*   
      (13.60) (10.07)   
  Religious       35.43** 15.00*   
      (14.10) (8.709)   
  Linguistic       5.574 14.39   
      (12.39) (9.867)   
Lexical index     15.69***  12.29***   
     (0.870)  (0.762)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    15.55**   5.039   
    (7.444)   (3.999)   
  Mixed    12.78*   1.734   
    (7.170)   (5.302)   
  Other    -16.83   -39.20***   
    (24.91)   (10.92)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.630***  
        (0.061)  
   Agricultural         2.220***  
      suitability        (0.401)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 54.31*** 47.15*** 46.80*** 49.49*** 33.21*** 47.40*** 28.94***   
 (2.367) (1.719) (2.386) (1.744) (1.302) (2.393) (1.500)   
Polities 196 196 162 165 188 176 141 163 
Years 226 226 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 20,277 20,277 10,904 18,037 13,511 12,364 7,465 17,852 
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.131 0.049 0.111 0.136 0.048 0.119  
Chi2        398.36 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the top-two formula applied to votes won in elections to 
the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B7:  Top-two formula applied to legislative seats 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  6.724*** 5.901*** 4.037** 8.408*** 3.225*** 3.466*** 3.809***  6.351** 
   (log) (1.455) (1.172) (1.614) (1.468) (0.924) (1.344) (1.244)  (2.848) 
GDP pc (log) 19.64***  15.20*** 21.55*** 5.131*** 14.81*** -0.0289 -.0671 19.868*** 
 (2.012)  (3.010) (2.004) (1.377) (2.261) (2.532) (0.084) (2.181) 
English colony 6.578  6.321 11.63* -5.902* -2.570 -2.620 0.040 3.321 
 (6.697)  (5.339) (6.754) (3.298) (5.894) (3.694) (0.243) (7.084) 
Urbanization   36.94**    0.795   
   (16.84)    (10.20)   
Latitude (log)       -3.327   
       (2.236)   
Oil income pc       -1.993   
       (4.974)   
Years indep (log)       0.000253   
       (0.000695)   
Protestant       -1.528*   
       (0.860)   
Muslim       0.0603   
       (0.0472)   
       -0.0659   
       (0.0720)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -35.87*** 2.497   
      (11.59) (8.079)   
  Religious       32.57*** 29.90***   
      (11.46) (9.331)   
  Linguistic       0.629 -3.145   
      (10.05) (6.503)   
Lexical index     14.28***  11.52***   
     (0.744)  (0.651)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    11.99**   2.004   
    (6.065)   (3.713)   
  Mixed    5.090   -2.081   
    (5.544)   (3.899)   
  Other    -6.804   0.497   
    (18.14)   (15.86)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.629***  
        (0.060)  
   Agricultural         2.151***  
      suitability        (0. 384)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 49.75*** 42.23*** 43.77*** 46.48*** 32.66*** 43.49*** 28.92***   
 (1.709) (1.347) (1.889) (1.372) (1.074) (1.789) (1.227)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 192 177 143 164 
Years 227 227 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,782 21,782 11,889 19,385 14,585 13,466 8,120 19,059 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.116 0.043 0.092 0.115 0.042 0.101  
Chi2        471.75 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the top-two formula applied to seats won in elections to 
the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted.  
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Table B8:  Incumbent-challenger formula applied to legislative votes 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  7.812*** 6.970*** 5.369*** 10.34*** 3.920*** 4.027** 7.287***  8.038** 
   (log) (1.826) (1.539) (2.055) (1.972) (1.011) (1.700) (1.449)  (3.474) 
GDP pc (log) 25.24***  20.10*** 26.97*** 4.814*** 18.93*** 1.322 -0.0779 25.12*** 
 (2.584)  (3.700) (2.485) (1.683) (3.192) (2.971) (0.0850) (2.798) 
English colony 21.84***  21.95*** 31.49*** 6.814* 12.68 16.37*** 0.00330 17.13** 
 (8.015)  (6.716) (8.828) (3.750) (7.922) (5.583) (0.236) (8.622) 
Urbanization   46.77**    0.495   
   (19.36)    (12.42)   
Latitude (log)       -4.573   
       (2.818)   
Oil income pc       8.336   
       (6.672)   
Years indep (log)       -0.00428*   
       (0.00222)   
Protestant       -0.253   
       (1.131)   
Muslim       0.115*   
       (0.0652)   
       0.129   
       (0.0870)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -52.27*** -29.87**   
      (14.62) (12.05)   
  Religious       35.16** 23.12**   
      (15.68) (10.00)   
  Linguistic       -0.705 7.532   
      (13.55) (11.85)   
Lexical index     18.42***  14.74***   
     (0.956)  (0.884)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    22.32***   12.41**   
    (8.615)   (5.070)   
  Mixed    17.05**   3.744   
    (8.328)   (6.486)   
  Other    -10.19   -43.23***   
    (26.79)   (12.58)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.632***  
        (0.0612)  
   Agricultural         2.209***  
      suitability        (0.401)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 61.06*** 53.52*** 54.86*** 56.19*** 38.71*** 54.13*** 35.83***   
 (2.455) (1.873) (2.641) (1.792) (1.358) (2.598) (1.558)   
Polities 196 196 162 165 188 176 141 163 
Years 226 226 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 20,114 20,114 10,846 17,914 13,413 12,262 7,415 17,729 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.128 0.051 0.109 0.136 0.050 0.117  
Chi2        407.35 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the top-two formula applied to votes won in elections to 
the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 0.  Standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted.  
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Table B9:  Top-two formula applied to combined measure  
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  5.177*** 5.092*** 3.351* 7.432*** 2.360*** 2.182 5.021***  7.048** 
   (log) (1.567) (1.253) (1.725) (1.638) (0.840) (1.425) (1.095)  (3.119) 
GDP pc (log) 19.84***  15.81*** 22.56*** 4.100*** 15.54*** 3.310 -0.0692 20.62*** 
 (2.253)  (3.054) (2.116) (1.358) (2.679) (2.167) (0.0845) (2.407) 
English colony 16.40**  16.26*** 21.42*** 5.503* 8.239 8.928** 0.0318 11.82 
 (7.129)  (5.694) (7.381) (3.325) (6.738) (3.559) (0.234) (7.532) 
Urbanization   42.20**    6.424   
   (16.40)    (8.970)   
Latitude (log)       -6.219***   
       (1.654)   
Oil income pc       10.24**   
       (4.137)   
Years indep (log)       -0.00328**   
       (0.00135)   
Protestant       -0.848   
       (0.953)   
Muslim       0.129***   
       (0.0494)   
       0.000449   
       (0.0599)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -34.54** -17.12*   
      (13.97) (9.772)   
  Religious       33.67** 13.37*   
      (13.60) (7.807)   
  Linguistic       -2.745 9.856   
      (12.58) (9.849)   
Lexical index     15.27***  12.16***   
     (0.791)  (0.748)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    12.69*   3.824   
    (6.705)   (3.351)   
  Mixed    11.37   1.938   
    (6.943)   (5.321)   
  Other    -14.62   -32.96***   
    (23.25)   (10.76)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.627***  
        (0.0611)  
   Agricultural         2.180***  
      suitability        (0.392)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 52.25*** 45.44*** 44.94*** 47.85*** 32.16*** 45.76*** 28.64***   
 (2.111) (1.543) (2.172) (1.565) (1.136) (2.206) (1.347)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 191 177 142 164 
Years 227 227 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,264 21,264 11,576 18,946 14,476 13,038 7,996 18,751 
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.124 0.046 0.100 0.129 0.043 0.114  
Chi2        398.52 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the top-two formula applied to votes won in elections to 
the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature and presidential elections.  Estimator: tobit, left-censored at 
0.  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant omitted. 
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Table B10:  Largest party formula applied to combined measure 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit, IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 
Population  3.973*** 3.646*** 2.713** 5.325*** 2.174*** 2.017** 3.328***  3.934** 
   (log) (0.941) (0.771) (1.203) (0.978) (0.520) (0.951) (0.880)  (1.983) 
GDP pc (log) 13.93***  11.41*** 15.53*** 3.224*** 10.89*** 0.621 -0.0737 14.48*** 
 (1.559)  (2.225) (1.523) (0.989) (1.923) (1.832) (0.0844) (1.652) 
English colony 9.973**  10.06*** 14.62*** 1.341 5.468 6.894** 0.0220 6.479 
 (4.313)  (3.903) (4.607) (1.887) (4.644) (3.091) (0.235) (4.751) 
Urbanization   30.19***    8.214   
   (11.40)    (7.997)   
Latitude (log)       -3.477**   
       (1.615)   
Oil income pc       5.254   
       (4.016)   
Years indep (log)       -0.00235**   
       (0.00116)   
Protestant       -0.736   
       (0.843)   
Muslim       0.142***   
       (0.0484)   
       0.0156   
       (0.0545)   
Fractionalization          
  Ethnic       -33.54*** -14.50*   
      (9.376) (8.115)   
  Religious       16.58* 4.509   
      (9.432) (6.877)   
  Linguistic       5.423 9.838   
      (8.504) (7.204)   
Lexical index     10.66***  8.637***   
     (0.509)  (0.520)   
Electoral systems          
  Majoritarian    [omitted]   [omitted]   
  Proportional    12.15***   6.414**   
    (4.465)   (2.613)   
  Mixed    9.513**   2.803   
    (4.671)   (3.679)   
  Other    -2.785   -14.34**   
    (16.75)   (7.291)   
Instruments          
   Area (log)        0.627***  
        (0.0609)  
   Agricultural         2.103***  
      suitability        (0.390)  
Region FE  ü     ü   
Decade FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Sigma 35.35*** 31.21*** 31.84*** 32.61*** 22.42*** 31.77*** 20.69***   
 (1.351) (1.128) (1.444) (1.077) (0.989) (1.422) (1.096)   
Polities 197 197 163 166 191 177 142 164 
Years 227 227 111 215 215 120 107 215 
Observations 21,424 21,424 11,710 19,106 14,633 13,134 8,077 18,871 
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.133 0.052 0.110 0.142 0.050 0.127  
Chi2        376.03 
Replicates Table 4 with a different measure of contestation – the largest-party formula applied to votes won in elections 
to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature and in presidential elections.  Estimator: tobit, left-
censored at 0.  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by polity.  ***p<0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  Constant 
omitted. 
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Online Appendix C:  Relationship to Democracy 
Our ambition is to measure contestation – not the larger, more diffuse concept of electoral democracy 
(not to mention the even larger and more diffuse concept of democracy, tout court). Nonetheless, the 
two concepts are closely related, so it is worth reviewing this conceptual and empirical relationship 
before continuing. 
Arguably, indices of contestation offer a reflection of the freeness/fairness of an election. If the 
incumbent party buys votes on a massive scale, imprisons opposition leaders, monopolizes sources of 
campaign finance and access to the media, or simply prevents other parties from appearing on the 
ballot, that election is likely to receive a lower contestation score, as pointed out. Note that it is usually 
the incumbent party that violates democratic norms – tilting the playing field in its favor – for it is by 
construction the largest party and is in a position to utilize the apparatus of the state. As such, the 
incumbent-challenger index – and, to some extent, the other indices introduced above – may be 
regarded as outcome-based measures of electoral democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán 2002). 
However, they are imperfect measures. Sometimes, incumbents win big even though the rules 
of the game are fair (e.g., Lyndon Johnson in the US presidential election of 1964). Sometimes, 
incumbents lose even though the rules of the game are unfair (e.g., Malaysia in 2018). Likewise, our 
measures take no notice of suffrage rights or ways in which electoral participation is informally 
restricted. Needless to say, our indices do not reflect dimensions of democracy that are non-electoral 
in character, e.g., judicial independence, rule of law, civil liberty, horizontal accountability, the strength 
of civil society, et al. 
 To shed light on the empirical relationship between electoral contestation and democracy we 
present a series of descriptive statistics in Table C1. The first set correlates the incumbent-challenger 
index with prominent indices of electoral democracy – the Polyarchy (aka Electoral democracy) index 
from the Varieties of Democracy project (Teorell et al. 2016), the Polity2 index from the Polity IV 
project (Marshall et al. 2014), the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015), and the 
BMR index from Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013). The second set focus on more specific components 
often associated with democracy – clean elections, party institutionalization, liberal freedoms, 
participation, and equality – as measured by the Variety of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018). 
Although correlations between contestation and various measures of democracy are fairly 
strong in the unrestricted sample (column 1), they drop considerably in the sample that excludes 0 
scores (column 1). This suggests that a judgment of no contestation accords with a judgment of no 
(or very little) democracy: multi-party elections, after all, are commonly viewed as a sine qua non of 
democracy. However, where multi-party elections are allowed, degrees of contestation do not accord 
very closely to degrees of electoral democracy as measured by standard indices of the latter. 
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Table C1:  Contestation and Democracy 
 Contestation 
Sample: Full 0’s 
Electoral democracy indices   
   Polyarchy (V-Dem) 0.80 0.48 
   Polity2 (Polity IV) 0.73 0.54 
   Lexical (Skaaning et al.) 0.78 0.47 
   BMR (Boix et al.) 0.69 0.50 
Democracy components   
   Clean elections (V-Dem)   0.84 0.51 
   Party institutionalization (V-Dem) 0.53 0.40 
   Liberal (V-Dem) 0.66 0.52 
   Participatory (V-Dem) 0.74 0.46 
   Egalitarian (V-Dem) 0.59 0.37 
Note:  Pearson’s r correlation between contestation 
(incumbent-challenger) and various democracy indices 
and democracy components, tested in a full sample 
and a sample excluding zero contestation scores. 
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